This article examines the concept of emodiversity, put forward by Quoidbach et al. (2014) as a novel source of information about "the health of the human emotional ecosystem" (p. 2057). Quoidbach et al. drew an analogy between emodiversity as a desirable property of a person's emotional make-up and biological diversity as a desirable property of an ecosystem. They claimed that emodiversity was an independent predictor of better mental and physical health outcomes in two large-scale studies. Here, we show that Quoidbach et al.'s construct of emodiversity suffers from several theoretical and practical deficiencies, which make these authors' use of Shannon's (1948) entropy formula to measure emodiversity highly questionable. Our reanalysis of Quoidbach et al.'s two studies shows that the apparently substantial effects that these authors reported are likely due to a failure to conduct appropriate hierarchical regression in one case and to suppression effects in the other. It appears that Quoidbach et al.'s claims about emodiversity may reduce to little more than a set of computational and statistical artifacts.
presented a novel construct, emodiversity, to represent the degree to which an individual experiences a wide range of emotions, analogous to the idea of biodiversity in the natural environment. Emodiversity can be conceptualized either on separate axes of positive and negative emodiversity or as a single overall "global emodiversity." In two large studies, Quoidbach et al. claimed to have found associations between emodiversity and health outcomes, independent of the associations between the corresponding positive or negative emotions and those outcomes: "Emodiversity is a practically important and previously unidentified metric for assessing the health of the human emotional ecosystem" (Quoidbach et al., 2014 (Quoidbach et al., , p. 2057 . Quoidbach et al. (2014) operationalized emodiversity in terms of a concept from the field of information theory known as Shannon entropy (Shannon, 1948) . They claimed that this concept, originally devised by Shannon to represent the information content of a message in a communication system, also "quantifies the number of species and the evenness of species in a biological ecosystem" (p. 2058). In support of this claim, they cited Magurran (2004) , who actually cautioned that "most commentators who discuss the relative merits of the various methods of measuring diversity go out of their way to underline the disadvantages of the Shannon index" (Magurran, 2004, p. 106) . However, leaving aside that debate, the validity of Quoidbach et al.'s concept clearly depends on the degree to which it faithfully implements Shannon entropy; its ability to generate reliable, meaningful, and measureable variance across participants; and the behavior of emodiversity when applied to real data. The present article examines whether emodiversity lives up to these requirements.
This article is structured as follows. First, we examine the theoretical underpinnings of emodiversity, especially the applicability of Shannon entropy to the specific context of a multi-item measure of emotions using Likert-type responses. Second, we reanalyze Quoidbach et al.'s (2014) empirical findings to identify where the purported evidence for their remarkable claims about the health benefits of emodiversity might have come from. Finally, we briefly discuss the broader lessons to be learned from this case.
Theoretical Issues

Limitations of the Analogy With Biodiversity
Biodiversity is defined in terms of the richness and evenness of the variety of species within an ecosystem. Richness is the number of distinct species to be found in a given sample, regardless of how many examples (provided that the number is greater than zero) of that species are detected, whereas evenness is the degree to which the populations of each species (or, in some definitions, the corresponding biomass) are similar. In Quoidbach et al.'s (2014) definition of emodiversity, the equivalent of biological richness is the number of different emotions experienced whereas the equivalent of evenness is the extent to which the frequency with which a person reports experiencing each emotion is similar across all of the measured emotions. However, both of these dimensions of Shannon's (1948) original model or in the Shannon-Wiener index of biodiversity. These limitations severely impair the correspondence between emodiversity and Shannon entropy.
Richness
In a biodiversity setting, the richness of a community is usually unbounded. It would certainly be unusual for richness to be subjected to an a priori upper limit imposed by the designer of a field study. However, with emodiversity, the degree to which the richness of participants' emotional experience can be captured is limited by the number of items making up the measure being used. For example, in their Study 1, Quoidbach et al. (2014) used a modified version of the Differential Emotion Scale (mDES), asking participants how often they experienced each of nine positive and nine negative emotions in a recent period. In contrast, the Positive and Negative Affected Schedule -Expanded Form (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994) measures 30 different positive emotions (and 30 negative ones); for example, this scale allows participants to provide distinct reports of the extent to which they feel calm, relaxed, and at ease. Leaving aside for a moment questions of the meaning of taxonomies of emotions (e.g., Kristjánsson, 2003; Solomon, 2002) and the possible discrepancies-whether caused by demand characteristics, social desirability concerns, faulty recollection, or some other issue-between people's actual emotional experiences and how they describe them, especially if they are asked about experiences in the past rather than the present (Robinson & Clore, 2002) , this would seem to imply that emodiversity should be measured using a scale that allows the greatest possible number of emotions to be reported. By analogy, sending a field biologist out to report the number of (only) rabbits, mice, rats, voles, and beavers in a given area, while ignoring foxes or wolves because there was no corresponding space on the form, might lead to suboptimal decisions about conservation policy. However, Quoidbach et al. did not address this question, although it appears to be of crucial theoretical importance; in their two empirical studies, they used measures with only 9 and 10 positive and negative emotions, respectively.
Evenness
When the Shannon-Wiener index is used in field biology, the count associated with each species is precisely the number of examples of that species observed in the community. However, a self-report by participants in a psychological study of the extent to which they experienced various emotions will not typically be expressed in terms of a count of discrete occasions. A question such as "How many times did you experience contentment in the last week?" is almost meaningless; for one thing, the existence of 20 distinct occasions of contentment implies 20 transitions from a state of noncontentment, so that somebody who remained contented the whole time would have a very low score. Similar to most researchers asking about past emotional states, Quoidbach et al. (2014) used measures that asked participants to report the relative frequency with which they experienced each emotion on a Likerttype scale, with the following possible responses: 0 ϭ never, 1 ϭ rarely, 2 ϭ some of the time, 3 ϭ often, and 4 ϭ most of the time. However, this decision imposes severe limitations on the potentially measurable (un)evenness of emotions (to go with the limitations previously noted on the measurement of richness) because the range of possible values is so small. It is equivalent to a field biologist who uses the Shannon-Wiener index to measure biodiversity reporting the numbers of each species that were observed as none, a few, some, quite a lot, and very many, with these groupings subsequently being coded 0 -4 and the resulting numbers injected into Shannon's formula. Such an operation would result in the loss of a great deal of information compared with the recording of the exact numbers of each species that were observed.
Could this problem be alleviated by asking participants to report the frequency with which they experienced each emotion on a wider numerical scale, perhaps in the range 0 -100? This would seem to allow the relative frequency of emotional experiences to be described with greater (albeit still bounded) precision, thus allowing for more differentiation of the "evenness" component of emodiversity. However, it is unclear whether many individuals are sufficiently aware of their emotional experiences that they could meaningfully assign values of, say, 34 to one and 37 to another. In a classic paper, Miller (1956) described the general problem of people's limited ability to distinguish between more than about seven levels of a unidimensional construct. Experience from several fields with these kinds of numerical-rating scales (e.g., Berbaum, Dorfman, Franken, & Caldwell, 2002; DeSoto, 2016; Mickes, Wixted, & Wais, 2007) suggests that the most responses will likely be multiples of 10, with a tendency to cluster further around 0, 50, and 100. The problem for emodiversity is that if each respondent only uses, say, five different numbers from the range of 0 -100 to describe their frequencies of emotional experience, then the result is mathematically equivalent to the case in which they are constrained to choose from a range of 0 -4, and this holds even if every participant chooses a different set of five numbers. Perhaps a better way to measure the range and variety of a person's emotional experiences, suggested by a reviewer of the present article, might be to use some form of diary, with sampling of emotions at either regular or random intervals (e.g., the Experience Sampling Method; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987) ; provided that a sufficient number of "species" of emotion could be defined, this could potentially result in measures of evenness that are more mathematically meaningful. Quoidbach et al.'s (2014) failure to correctly implement the concept of Shannon entropy, described in the preceding section, has immediate and severe consequences for the numerical behavior of the measurement of emodiversity. We enumerated all possible combinations of zero (never) and nonzero responses for various possible numbers of scale items and response formats (0 -4 and 0 -100). The results, shown in detail in our online supplemental information, demonstrate that unless a participant 1 In fact, Quoidbach et al. (2014) did not report the exact responses corresponding to the values 1, 2, and 3. We have assumed that the version of the mDES that these authors used in Study 1 was similar to that described by Fredrickson (2013) , from which the responses shown here are taken, and that the responses for the unnamed 10-item measure used in Study 2 were similarly labeled. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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responds that they never experience approximately two-thirds of the emotions being measured-a contingency that would probably raise questions about the validity of the instrument being usedthe ratio between the lowest and highest possible emodiversity values is very small (ϳ1.1:1 for a scale having a 0 -4 response format and 1.5:1 for one with a 0 -100 response format). Furthermore, even this range of values is only possible under rather implausible circumstances because the highest and lowest scores for emodiversity are obtained when participants exhibit highly unusual response patterns (all identical responses for the maximum score; alternating extreme responses, or large numbers of never responses, for the minimum score). However, psychologists normally do not say that individuals who display such response patterns "have high [or low] emotional diversity." Rather, they say that such people "are not paying attention" and typically exclude these participants' data altogether. Hence, the practical range of emodiversity values from any given measure of emotions is even less than the mathematical limits would suggest. To summarize, we believe that emodiversity-as defined by Quoidbach et al. using the Shannon entropy formula and implemented using short emotion measures with limited ranges of responses-is unlikely to provide any meaningful amount of variance, independent of the underlying emotion measure, to be empirically explained. Quoidbach et al. (2014) defined people's emodiversity as "the variety and relative abundance of the emotions they experience" (p. 2057). However, it is not clear that the formula these authors used to calculate emodiversity fully corresponds to this definition. The formula generates the highest possible value of emodiversity when all of the responses are equal and nonzero: "If all the emotions of the list were evenly experienced, then emodiversity would be maximal" (Quoidbach et al., 2014 (Quoidbach et al., , p. 2059 ; italics in original). However, this maximum value of emodiversity is attained whatever this nonzero value might be (1, 2, 3, or 4). This means that Alice, who experiences all nine positive emotions (alertness, amusement, etc.) only rarely, has exactly the same emodiversity as Bob, who experiences all of these emotions most of the time, and higher emodiversity than Carol, who experiences four of the nine emotions some of the time and five of them often. Furthermore, any increase in Alice's experience of one of these emotions will result in an immediate reduction in her emodiversity. Given Quoidbach et al.'s claims about the health benefits of higher emodiversity, this would appear to be a good reason for Alice not to attempt to increase her currently minimal frequency of, say, amusement to some of the time by watching comedy shows until she is sure that she can simultaneously increase the frequency with which she experiences the other positive emotions to the same extent. Thus, once a minimum level of frequency of experiencing emotions has been established, there can be no benefit (of increased emodiversity) in increasing the frequency with which one experiences any particular emotion unless this specific emotion is in some way lagging behind the others (e.g., if one currently experiences eight emotions often and one only some of the time). Therefore, it is not clear where the "relative abundance" component of Quoidbach et al.'s (2014) definition of emodiversity is to be found, given that a person experiencing all positive emotions only rarely already has the highest possible emodiversity score. This result also suggests that any difference in emodiversity between two participants who report never experiencing the same number of emotions is very likely to be nothing more than noise.
Abundance Is Not Measured
Empirical Issues
In the first part of this article, we have shown that Quoidbach et al. (2014) 's emodiversity is merely a pastiche of Shannon entropy, with several conceptual lacunae that make the application of Shannon's (1948) formula invalid. (For reasons of space, we have omitted some other important problems, such as the apparent requirement that participants be forced to provide responses to all items on the emotion measures being used or the questionable validity of applying the arithmetic of Shannon's formula to numbers that are merely categorical labels on participants' reports of the frequency with which emotions were experienced; these and other issues are covered in detail in our online supplemental material.) In fact, we believe that any observed variance in emodiversity is likely to be little more than statistical noise. In view of this, it is necessary to explain how Quoidbach et al. (2014) concluded that emodiversity independently predicted depression (Study 1) or an assortment of physical health outcomes (Study 2) to the substantial degree that they reported in their article. Therefore, in this section we examine how these results might have come about if this were not due to the claimed predictive power of emodiversity.
Study 1
Dr. Quoidbach (personal communication, November 15, 2015) kindly provided us with the data set for Study 1, which examined the relation between emodiversity and depressive symptoms, while controlling for emotions, in a sample of 35,844 participants who were recruited via a TV show. Using SPSS, we were able to reproduce perfectly all of the results reported by Quoidbach et al. (2014) in their article. However, we conducted the majority of our reanalyses in R; our code is available at https://osf.io/vu4uq/. Quoidbach et al. (2014) claimed that the results of their regressions showed that emodiversity substantially and significantly predicted their main outcome variable (depression) over and above the effect of positive or negative emotions themselves. For example, when positive emotion, positive emodiversity, and their interaction were entered into a regression, the reported standardized regression coefficients (␤) of these three terms were, respectively, Ϫ.40, Ϫ.36, and Ϫ.14. However, simply reporting these coefficients (and their corresponding partial rs) does not demonstrate a substantial effect of emodiversity. First, as our Table 1 shows, when positive emodiversity and the interaction term are entered into a hierarchical regression after first entering positive emotion, there is almost no increase in the variance explained at each step; R 2 increases from .381 (positive emotion only) to .394 (addition of positive emodiversity) to .397 (addition of the interaction term). That is, the addition of emodiversity and the interaction term make very little difference to the explanatory power of the model, with just 1.3% of extra variance explained by emodiversity and another 0.3% explained by the interaction. (For negative emodiversity, the amount of additional variance explained is This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
essentially zero, as explained in the section entitled "The effect of adding quadratic terms to the regression models" in our online supplemental material.) Second, when the interaction term is added, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all three terms become quite large, further suggesting that multicollinearity is playing a major role (as could be expected from the correlation of .75 between positive emotion and positive emodiversity). Third, when the interaction term is entered, the standardized regression coefficient (␤) for emodiversity more than doubles in magnitude, from Ϫ.175 to Ϫ.364, suggesting that substantial confounding effects are emerging at this point. Our Table 1 also shows the similar results that are obtained when hierarchical techniques are used to explore the other regression analyses in Quoidbach et al.'s (2014) Study 1. For negative emotion and emodiversity, R 2 remains static (within the limitations of rounding) at .460 when emodiversity is added to the basic regression of depressive symptoms on negative emotion and increases only to .466 when the interaction term is added; furthermore, similar patterns of high VIFs and suppression values are observed as for positive emotion and emodiversity. The addition of global emodiversity to a model predicting depression from positive and negative emotion results in a negligible increase in R 2 (from .592 to .595), and further suppression effects can be observed. Taken together, these results suggest that emodiversity has little independent contribution to make to the prediction of depressive symptoms over and above the well-established role of positive and negative emotions in that regard.
Study 2
In their Study 2, using a nationally representative sample of 10,000 Belgian adults, Quoidbach et al. (2014) claimed that both positive and negative emodiversity, when entered into a multiple regression together with the corresponding emotion scores and the interaction between these two variables, predicted health outcomes such as doctor's visits, days spent in hospital, and medical expenditure better than factors for which the associations with health are well established, such as diet, exercise, and smoking. If these claims were to be verified, the implications for public health policy would be substantial. In principle, a simple questionnaire asking people how often they experienced particular emotions in the past week would potentially provide better information about the population's health status for a whole year than complex measures of actual behavior.
Unfortunately, the data for Quoidbach et al.'s (2014) Study 2 are not currently publicly available. As a result, we have been unable to determine whether the same issues concerning the lack of additional predicted variance when emodiversity is added to the regression model, seen in Study 1, are also present in Study 2. However, even without access to the data, it can be readily shown that many of the results in Study 2 are the result of statistical suppression effects. For example, when Quoidbach et al. entered positive emodiversity, mean positive emotion, and their interaction into a regression predicting doctor's visits, they reported obtaining a standardized regression coefficient (␤) for positive emodiversity a Denotes a coefficient that has either a greater magnitude or a different sign compared with the corresponding zero-order correlation, indicating that suppression has occurred. b Denotes a coefficient that has increased in magnitude from the previous step, indicating that some form of confounding has occurred. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
of Ϫ.29. However, their Table 2 shows that the zero-order correlation between positive emodiversity and doctor's visits was just Ϫ.05. The presence, in multiple regression results, of a ␤ coefficient of greater magnitude (or different sign) to the zeroorder correlation between the same variables indicates that suppression has occurred. Suppression is often seen in regression models when two predictors are correlated, with at least one of them having a correlation with the outcome variable that is either zero (a situation referred to as "classical" suppression) or only relatively modest in magnitude compared with the correlation of the other predictor ("negative suppression"). However, suppression will also (always) occur when two predictors are positively correlated with each other-even to a very small extent-while having correlations of opposite sign with the outcome ("reciprocal suppression"). Inspection of Quoidbach et al.'s (2014) Table 3 suggests that suppression effects are behind the great majority of the results from Study 2. Of the 18 zero-order correlations among positive, negative, and global emodiversity and Quoidbach et al.'s list of six health outcomes, only two (positive emodiversity correlated with doctor's costs, and negative emodiversity correlated with hospital costs, both at r ϭ Ϫ.07) are large enough to be statistically significant at the .05 level, even with the sample size of 1,273; this suggests that there is uncertainty about the magnitude, and even the sign, of some of these correlations. However, when these data were used in a regression model, Quoidbach et al. reported standardized regression coefficients of greater magnitude than the zero-order correlations in all 18 cases, with 16 of these being statistically significant at the .05 level. Each of these coefficients appears to be the product of suppression effects. For positive emodiversity, these effects mostly take the form of negative suppression, resulting from the high correlation between positive emotion and emodiversity, combined with the fact that the zeroorder correlations between positive emodiversity and the outcome variable are smaller than those between positive emotion and the outcome variable.
2 In contrast, for negative emodiversity the suppression effects mostly take the form of reciprocal suppression, caused by the positive correlations between negative emotion and emodiversity and between negative emotion and the outcome, combined with the negative correlation between negative emodiversity and the outcome (Conger, 1974) .
In the absence of a solid theoretical explanation, results based on suppression are typically uninterpretable. Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, and Tracy (2004) presented what they claimed were two reproducible examples of suppression situations in psychology, but there do not seem to be many major effects in the psychological literature that are consistently and reliably explained in terms of theoretically justified suppression. In particular, the existence of classical, negative, and reciprocal suppression effects in the same study seems difficult to explain theoretically because these effects result from different patterns of relationships between predictors and outcome (Conger, 1974) . It seems to us that by far the most parsimonious explanation here is that most of the statistically significant ␤ coefficients in Quoidbach et al.'s (2014) Study 2 are the result of a combination of noisy data and the high correlation between the predictors (i.e., positive or negative emotion and the corresponding form of emodiversity). Quoidbach et al. (2014) drew some far-reaching conclusions about the impact of emodiversity on mental and physical health from their two correlational studies. From their Study 1, they concluded that emodiversity has incremental predictive validity, over and above that associated with emotions of the same valence, for depression. From their Study 2, they concluded that emodiversity was at least as good a predictor of physical health as regular exercise, a healthy diet, and refraining from smoking. However, as we have shown, these results are probably nothing more than a statistical mirage. Once the regression analyses in Study 1 were conducted in a hierarchical manner it became clear that the incremental effect of emodiversity in terms of added variance explained was negligible, whereas in Study 2 the apparently substantial regression coefficients were shown to be the product of suppression effects. In both cases, the fact that most of these regression coefficients and their associated partial correlation coefficients were statistically significant at the traditional .05 level is neither surprising (given the large sample sizes used by Quoidbach et al.) nor very meaningful. With many hundreds or thousands of participants, we feel that the effect size (as measured by the increase in R 2 ) is a more appropriate indication of the influence of emodiversity than a p value.
Conclusion
This problem appears to have arisen, at least in part, as a result of a misunderstanding of the principles of a mathematical concept that has been imported from another field. As we have shown, Quoidbach et al.'s (2014) application of Shannon entropy is inappropriate given the constraints imposed by the nature of the measures of emotional experience being used, such as the fact that a fixed number of emotions are measured, corresponding to a fixed list of "species," and a limited number of responses are allowed, corresponding to a limited range of possible population values. (This is not to suggest that, when applied to data obtained from more appropriate measures, Shannon entropy might not be useful in other areas of psychology or the social sciences more generally; see, e.g., Vaquero & Cebrian, 2013) . As one of us has pointed out previously (Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, 2013) , researchers in psychology and other social sciences who wish to borrow concepts from the natural sciences or mathematics should ensure that they understand all of the conditions for the use of those concepts to be valid. The fact that a set of mathematical formulas (such as those for calculating Shannon entropy, but also those for performing ordinary least squares regression) can be applied to psychological data is no guarantee that the results that emerge from the application of these formulas will have any meaning in the real world.
In conclusion, we do not claim that the idea of emotional diversity is inherently devoid of any possible utility. However, for such utility to be demonstrated, it will be necessary to identify ways of operationalizing and measuring this construct that are not compromised by mathematical artifacts and statistical confounds. In its present form, Quoidbach et al.'s (2014) construct of emodiversity does not meet this standard.
2 Specifically, for two predictors X 1 and X 2 and an outcome Y, suppression will occur if the pattern of correlations between these three variables is such that rYX 1 /rYX 2 Ͻ rX 1 X 2 , where rAB is the zero-order correlation between any two variables A and B, and the identifiers X 1 and X 2 are assigned so that rYX 1 Ͻ rYX 2 . This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
